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RAMDASS v. COMMONWEALTH
246 Va. 413, 437 S.E.2d 566 (1993)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
Bobby Lee Ramdass and his accomplices returned home in the early
morning of September 2, 1992, after abandoning a plot to rob a restau-
rant. On the journey home, Ramdass suggested the robbery of a 7-Eleven
instead. Ramdass and Darrell Wilson carried pistols but the other three
men were unarmed. Wilson held the customers at gunpoint while the
other men pilfered money from the store and the wallets of the customers.
Ramdass ordered a convenience store clerk at gunpoint to open a safe and
shot him in the head when he was unsuccessful. The men then left the
store.
Ramdass pleaded guilty to robbery and requested immediate sen-
tencing, but the court deferred in response to the Commonwealth's attor-
ney's concern over a later double jeopardy claim. A jury convicted
Ramdass of use of a firearm in the commission of a murder and capital
murder. The jury imposed the death sentence based on a finding of future
dangerousness. Ramdass waived his right to a pre-sentence report and
asked to be sentenced immediately. Again, the court deferred until after
the report and then sentenced the defendant to death.
HOLDING
Consolidating the automatic review of Ramdass's death sentence
with his appeal from the capital murder conviction, the Supreme Court of
Virginia upheld the death sentence based on future dangerousness. The
court rejected each of Ramdass's numerous assignments of error, finding
that some were previously resolved in the court's prior decisions.
The court found that the Commonwealth's attorney was under no
obligation to make the results of accomplice polygraph examinations
known to the defense. The court stated that "Ramdass's speculation that
such statements might contain 'potentially exculpatory evidence' impos-
es neither a duty of disclosure upon the Commonwealth nor a duty of
inspection in camera by the court." 1
The court also held that Ramdass had no constitutional right to an ex
parte hearing on his motion for the appointment of a medical doctor and
an investigator to aid his defense.2 In addition, the court found'that
Ramdass suffered no illegal disadvantage when the trial judge refused to
sentence him immediately for robbery.
3
The court also reiterated its prior holding that evidence of parole
ineligibility is not admissible in capital murder cases and that the trial
judge's refusal to answer the jury's question concerning the defendant's
parole eligibility was proper. The trial judge decided this even though an
immediate robbery conviction would have meant life without parole.
4
The court also reaffirmed its position that cross-examination on unadju-
dicated acts cannot be used for the impeachment of witnesses.
5
1 Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413, 420, 437 S.E.2d 566,
570 (1993) (citing United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 631-32 (7th
Cir. 1984)).
2 246 Va. at 422, 437 S.E.2d at 571.
3 Id. at 423, 437 S.E.2d at 572.
4 Id. at 422-23, 437 S.E.2d at 572.
5 Id. at 424, 437 S.E.2d at 572.
6 Id. at 426, 437 S.E.2d at 574.
7 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
Finally, the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the imposition of tht
death sentence and found that the sentence was not arbitrary or excessiv
under Virginia Code section 17-110(c).
6
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
L Ex Parte Hearings
The Supreme Court of Virginia held that a constitutional right to aT
exparte hearing on a motion for a medical doctor and investigator does no
exist. In Ake v. Oklahoma,7 however, the United States Supreme Cour
found that the defendant has a constitutional right to the use of an inde
pendent expert at the state's expense when this expert is necessary for th
preparation of a defense. 8 Moreover, the Court specifically stated tha
"[w]hen the defendant is able to make an exparte threshold showing to tht
trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense
the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent . . ."9 Thus
the Court made clear that it envisioned Ake hearings to be ex parte pro
ceedings. This holding rests on the foundation that a trial is fundamental
ly unfair if the defendant is not given the basic tools to establish a defense
It is this fundamental fairness that precludes the presence of the stat(
at the hearing. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that th(
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires that the defendant b
given more than "mere access to the courthouse doors." 10 The defendan
must be given the tools with which to build an adequate defense before th(
state may proceed against him.11 This fundamental fairness argument also
requires that the defendant be given an ex parte hearing in which to argw
for these basic components of his defense. In order to establish the neec
for this expert, Ake requires a threshold showing that the expert is neces
sary to examine a significant factor in the defense. 12 This threshold show.
ing often requires that the defendant reveal much of his defense as well a,
attorney work product. Both the Fifth Circuit13 and the Tenth Circuit1'
have reversed convictions because of the failure of the trial court to gran
an exparte hearing to the accused on his motion for state payment for th(
cost of expert services.
Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claus(
requires that the defendant be given an ex parte hearing on his motion. .
defendant with the money to pay for an expert may refrain and use th(
assistance of an expert without revealing anything to the Commonwealth
The United States Supreme Court has held that the quality of the defen
dant's trial should not depend on the amount of money that the defendan
has. 15 In fact, the very purpose of the expert assistance is to place the indi.
gent defendant at least in part on the same level with the wealthy defen.
8 Id. at 86-87.
9 Id. at 82-83.
10 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974).
11 Id.
12 Ake, 470 U.S. at 86-87.
13 United States v. Sutton, 464 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1972).
14 Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1980).
15 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Page 26 - Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2
[ant. 16 Obviously, if the indigent defendant has to take all of these risks
aherent in the presence of the adversary in order to get the money for an
xpert, the two have not been placed on equal footing.
The Ake Court made clear that criminal defendants do not have to
ely upon the state's evidence and appraisal of the case for factors central
D their defense. In situations where expert assistance is a "basic tool of
lefense" 17 as to these important issues, Due Process and the Equal
'rotection clause require that the defendant be able to obtain such assis-
ance at the state's expense. Ake and its progeny, however, require a sig-
ificant threshold showing before the courts provide the funding neces-
ary to employ the expert. 18 The presence of the prosecution during the
ike hearing would undercut the substance of the Equal Protection Clause
[s interpreted by Ake.
Finally, the defendant deserves an ex parte hearing in order to pre-
erve his Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination. In Estelle v.
,,mith, 19 the United States Supreme Court recognized that the right to
emain silent has only been observed when the defendant suffers no
Senalty for his silence. In this instance, the defendant may suffer a very
eal penalty indeed if he chooses to remain silent; he may not get the
xpert necessary to present his defense.
Counsel should not be deterred by the Ramdass holding from seek-
ng ex parte hearings in order to make the requisite Ake showing.
II. Pleading Guilty to the Robbery Charge
In Ramdass, the defendant attempted to plead guilty to the robbery
,:harge and receive sentencing immediately. Prior to the holding in United
tates v. Dixon,20 this adjudicated guilt on the robbery charge possibly
21
,:ould have enabled the defendant to plead a double jeopardy bar to the
i'apital murder charge under the holding of Grady v. Corbin.22 Dixon,
iowever, overruled Grady. The law, as it stands today, provides that the
louble jeopardy bar only applies when the state uses the same offense in
;uccessive prosecutions. In the same prosecution, the state may use the
ame conduct as the basis for indictments for multiple crimes.
A. The Simmons Issue
Another purpose to pleading guilty to robbery and requesting imme-
ihate sentencing was to enable Ramdass to establish his ineligibility for
1 arole because of his three convictions for armed robbery. Under Virginia
Code section 53.1-151(B1)(iii), a person who has been convicted three
limes of "robbery by the presenting of firearms or other deadly weapon"
n three separate transactions is not eligible for parole.
The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse has argued that the defen-
16 United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1973). True
equality is, of course, neither a legal requirement nor a practical possibil-
ity. Wealthy defendants may avail themselves of expert resources con-
ceming minor issues not central to their defense.
17 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
18 See Volanty v. Lynaugh, 874 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding
defendant's contention that addiction made him insane insufficient as a
significant factor without supporting evidence). But see Little v.
Armentrout, 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987) (ruling that refusal to appoint
hypnotist was error when the witness did not make identification until
after hypnosis).
19 451 U.S. 454, 468 (1981).
20 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
21 It is also very possible that this tactic would not have worked
because of the "successive prosecution," "separate proceeding require-
ment." See Schiro v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994) and case summary of
Schiro, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
dant has the right to present his ineligibility for parole to the jury as mit-
igation evidence.2 3 In Gardner v. Florida,24 the United States Supreme
Court held that due process requires that a capital defendant be given the
chance to rebut any aggravating factors presented by the Commonwealth
in its effort to support the death penalty. Arguably, accurate parole law
information concerning a life sentence rebuts the Commonwealth's case
for death. This is especially true when the case rests on the future dan-
gerousness aggravating factor and the defendant will not be eligible for
parole if sentenced to life in prison. Also, in Lockett v. Ohio,25 the Court
held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments enable the defendant to
present all relevant mitigation evidence to the sentencing body. Accurate
parole law information can be seen as part of the evidence proffered as a
basis for a sentence less than death. It is relevant to the defendant's con-
tention that life in prison is severe and sufficient punishment. The United
States Supreme Court recently heard the GardnerlLockett arguments in
Simmons v. South Carolina26 and is currently considering the issues.
Should the Court agree in Simmons that the presentation of this form of
mitigation evidence is a basic constitutional right, a new sentencing hear-
ing for Ramdass will be required.
m. Request for the Results of the Accomplice
Polygraph Tests
The version of events that painted Ramdass as the more culpable
actor in the crime was proved by his accomplice Ramirez. Any evidence
undermining his credibility would be quite relevant. Here, the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that the Commonwealth did not have to disclose
the results of the accomplice's polygraph tests to the defense.27 It held a
showing that evidence was "potentially exculpatory" was insufficient
even to require in camera inspection by the court. It said that "[a]lthough
a defendant need not make an avowal of how a witness might testify in
order to obtain pretrial discovery of a witness's statement to the police,
he should describe the events to which the witness might testify and the
relevance of such matters to the crime charged in order to demonstrate its
required constitutional materiality to his guilt or punishment. ' 28 Ramdass
faced a "Catch-22" situation. He did not know the precise contents of the
polygraph results so he could not tell the court the requisite information.
Without access to the results, he could not elicit the information to make
the showing the court required.
As the court did recognize, the Commonwealth has a due process
obligation to turn over any evidence that tends to exculpate on guilt or
sentencing to the defense. 29 The court also recognized that exculpatory
evidence includes evidence that tends to undermine the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, regardless of the good faith or bad faith of the
22 495 U.S. 508 (1990) (forbidding use of some conduct relied upon
in prosecution of lesser offense to be employed in succeeding prosecution
on greater offense).
23 For a comprehensive explanation of all of these arguments, see
Straube, The Capital Defendant and Parole Eligibility, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 45 (1992).
24 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
25 438 U.S. 536 (1978).
26 114 S.Ct. 57 (1993).
27 Ramdass, 246 Va. at 421, 437 S.E.2d at 571.
28 246 Va. at 421,437 S.E.2d at 570.
29 Other defendants have faced the "Catch-22." The difference in
Ramdass, however, may be the court's refusal to require in camera
inspection by the trial judge. Such inspections are to the advantage of
both the prosecution and the defense. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
480 U.S. 39, 58 (1987) (holding that the trial judge had the right to deny
the discovery motion but that the trial judge had to examine the request-
ed record in camera).
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prosecution. 30 Thus, although the restrictive position of the court may be
constitutionally permissible, the Commonwealth risked a later determina-
tion that the polygraph results did include exculpatory evidence material
to the defense.3 1 It may be possible to maximize the chances of a later
reversal by adopting a very specific discovery request. The prosecution
has a duty to disclose any obviously exculpatory evidence even in the
absence of a request, but an especially specific request puts the govern-
ment and the court on notice that the defense considers this evidence to
be important. This, in turn may influence a later appellate determination
of the importance of the evidence to the trial outcome.
32
Further, in a situation similar to this one where the attorney does not
have detailed knowledge of the contents of the evidence, then a subpoe-
na duces tecum can be a useful tool. Virginia Rule 3A:12 allows the
defense to request the subpoena which will then issue unless the
Commonwealth resists. The subpoena duces tecum then puts the burden
on the Commonwealth to prevent the defense access to the records. Often,
no objection is made. If the Commonwealth objects to the issuance of the
subpoena, several grounds are available to support compelling its
issuance. The first of these grounds is the Compulsory Process and
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, supporting the right to put
on a defense and to meet the Commonwealth's case. Second, Virginia's
constitutional counterpart to the Compulsory Process Clause is Article I,
Section 8. This part of the Virginia Constitution has been liberally inter-
preted to include the right to investigate and the right to obtain docu-
ments. 33 There is a materiality requirement to the subpoena duces tecum
but it has been interpreted as "whether a substantial basis for claiming
materiality exists."'34 It is conceivable that the fact that the polygraph is
that of an accomplice might meet this standard all by itself.
There are other limitations on the use of subpoenas duces tecum in
these situations. The defense cannot issue a subpoena duces tecum to a
party. Therefore, a subpoena duces tecum will not be helpful if the
Commonwealth or some member of the Commonwealth's staff has pos-
session of the information. It might have been possible in this case, how-
ever, to serve a subpoena duces tecum on Ramirez if he got a copy of the
polygraph results. In any event, the subpoena duces tecum is a valuable
but under-utilized defense tool and is often superior to a discovery
motion.
IV. Use of Unadjudicated Acts to Impeach Accomplices'
30 Ramdass, 246 Va. at 420, 437 S.E.2d at 571. See also Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97 (1976).
31 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). See also United
States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1985).
32 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
33 Cox v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 324, 315 S.E.2d 228 (1984).
3 4 Id. at 328, 315 S.E.2d at 230 (emphasis added).
35 Again the defense counsel did an excellent job of federalizing the
issue of limiting the cross-examination of accomplices to prior convic-
tions with the claim that this restriction violated not just Virginia law, but
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
Testimony
Defendant attempted to cross-examine the accomplice concerning
unadjudicated criminal acts he may have committed. 35 The Supreme
Court of Virginia stated that "[i]t is well settled in Virginia that a liti-
gant's right to impeach the credibility of adverse witnesses by showing
their participation in criminal conduct has been confined to questions
about a conviction for a felony, perjury, and a misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude.
' 3 6
The Federal Rules of Evidence allow for the attorney to question the
witness about unadjudicated criminal actions for the purpose of under-
mining the credibility of the witness.37 We do not know the purpose of
the unadjudicated act examination in this case, but most jurisdictions
allow the use of unadjudicated bad acts to impeach the witness's veraci-
ty. State jurisdictions differ, however, about the use of bad acts to
impeach the witness when the acts do not result in a conviction. 38
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court of Virginia exercised its usual rigorous applica-
tion of default rules39 holding several issues defaulted that were previ-
ously raised at trial and assigned as error for failure to brief.
40
Nevertheless, counsel preserved on federal grounds a number of issues
that may result in the grant of relief as the case progresses beyond the
Supreme Court of Virginia.
Summary and analysis by:
Cameron P. Turner
3 6 Ramdass, 437 S.E.2d 566, 572 (emphasis added).
37 Fed. R. Evid. 608(b).
38 For example, South Carolina does not require a conviction bul
Maryland does. See State v. Hale, 526 S.E. 2d 418 (S.C. 1985). But sei
Robinson v. State, 468 A.2d 328 (Md. 1983). See also Marten Chevrolet
Inc. v. Seney, 439 A.2d 534 (Md. 1982).
39 See Groot, To Attain the Ends of Justice: Confronting Virginia':
Default Rules in Capital Cases, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
4 0 Ramdass, 426 Va. at 419, 437 S.E.2d at 569 (1993).
